# United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



## APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

To be argued by : STANLEY SCHIMMEL, Esq.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

75-1250

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee

Docket #75-1250

- against -

RICHARD THRASHER,

Appellant.


APPELLANT'S APPENDIX
PURSUANT TO
ANDERS V. CALIFORNIA .

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGEMENT

OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

STANLEY SCHIMMEL
Attorney for Appellant
32 Court Street
Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201
(212) 625-1200



PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL COPY

#### APPENDIX

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EJB:RJD:mb F.#733,313

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

## 73CR 600

SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT

T. 21, U.S.C. §173

T. 21, U.S.C. §174

T. 21, U.S.C. §846

T. 21, U.S.C. §848 T. 18, U.S.C. §2

Cr. No.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-against-

BILLY AUSTIN
JOHN BRYANT
ALVIN COOPER
ROBERT RAY DANIELS, a/k/a "Dutch Schultz"
HARRIET EVANS, a/k/a "Harriet Clark"
JOSEPH FERNANDEZ, a/k/a "Slim"
WALTER GILMORE
GATTIS HINTON

JOSEPH FERNANDEZ, a/k/a "Slim"
WALTER GILMORE
GATTIS HINTON
-FRANK MATTHEWS
BONNIE MC CALLUM
GERALD MIMS, a/k/a "Pop"
WILLIAM MOORE, a/k/a "B. I."
JOSEPH POLITE, a/k/a "Junior"
LARRY JTEWART
RICHARD THRASHER
CLINTON WHITE, a/k/a "Angel".


U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y.

Defendants. TIME A.M.

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

#### COUNT ONE

From on or about the 1st day of June 1970 up to and including the 17th day of January 1973, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York, and elsewhere, the defendants BILLY AUSTIN, JOHN BRYANT, ALVIN COOPER, ROBERT RAY DANIELS, a/k/a "Dutch Schultz", HARRIET EVANS, a/k/a "Harriet Clark", JOSEPH FERNANDEZ, a/k/a "Slim", WALTER GILMORE, CATTIS HINTON, FRANK MATTHEWS, BONNIE MC CALLUM, GERALD MIMS, a/k/a "Pop", WILLIAM MOORE, a/k/a "B.I.", JOSEPH POLITE, a/k/a "Junior", LARRY STEWART, RICHARD THRASHER, CLINTON WHITE, a/k/a "Angel", together with Donald James, named herein as a co-conspirator but not as a co-defendant, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did com-



bine, conspire, confederate and agree together and with each other to violate prior to May 1, 1971, Sections 173 and 174 of Title 21, United States Code, and on and after May 1, 1971 to violate Sections 812, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21, United States Code.

(1) It was part of said conspiracy that prior to May 1, 1971 the defendants unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly would receive, conceal, buy, sell and facilitate the transportation, concealment and sale of large amounts of heroin, a narcotic drug, after such narcotic drug had been imported and brought into the United States, knowing the same to have been imported and brought into the United States contrary to law.

- (2) It was further a part of said conspiracy that on and after May 1, 1971 up to and including January 17, 1973, the defendants knowingly and intentionally would possess with intent to distribute and would distribute large amounts of heroin, a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance.
- (3) It was further a part of said conspiracy that the defendants would conceal the existence of the conspiracy and would take steps designed to prevent disclosure of their activities.

In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed within the Eastern District and elsewhere:

#### OVERT ACTS

- (1) In or about December 1970, in the vicinity of Tapscott Street and Dumont Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, the defendant FRANK MATTHEWS met with the defendant ROBERT RAY DANIELS, a/k/a "Dutch Schultz" and the defendant HARRIET EVANS, a/k/a "Harriet Clark".
- (2) On or about April 9, 1971, in Brownie's Bar on St Marks Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, the defendant RICHARD THRASHER met with Donald James, named herein as a co-conspirator

but not as a defendant

(3) In or about October 1970, in the vicinity of Montgomery Street and Rogers Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, the defendant WILLIAM MOORE, a/k/a "B.I." met Donald James, named herein as a co-conspirator but not as a defendant.

- (4) On or about May 24, 1972, at 961 Belmont Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, the defendant GERALD MIMS, a/k/a "Pop" met with the defendant JOSEPH POLITE, a/k/a "Junior" and the defendant BONNIE MC CALLUM.
- (5) In or about January 1971, in the vicinity of East 92nd Street and Clarkson Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, the defendant GATTIS HINTON, a/k/a "Bud" met with Donald James, named herein as a co-conspirator but not as a co-defendant.
- (6) On or about April 9, 1971, in the vicinity of Nostrand and St. Marks Avenues, Brooklyn, New York, the defendant LARRY STEWART met with Donald James.
- (7) In or about October 1971, in the vicinity of Fenimore Street and Albany Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, the defendant JOHN BRYANT, the defendant WALTER GILMORE, the defendant ROBERT RAY DANIELS, a/k/a "Dutch Schultz", the defendant HARRIET EVANS, a/k/a "Harriet Clark" and the defendant CLINTON WHITE, a/k/a "Angel" had a meeting.
- (8) In or about November 1970, in the vicinity of Gates and Classon Avenues, Brooklyn, New York, the defendant WILLIAM MOORE, a/k/a "B.I." met with the defendant JOSEPH FERNANDEZ, a/k/a "Slim".
- (9) In or about October 1970, at 457 Schnectady Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, the defendant ALVIN COOPER met with the defendant ROBERT RAY DANIELS, a/k/a "Dutch Schultz". (Title 21, United States Code, Section 173, Section 174 and Section 846.)

#### COUNT TWO

On or about the 15th day of January 1971, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant ROBERT RAY DANIELS, a/k/a "Dutch Schultz" did receive, conceal, sell and

facilitate the transportation, concealment and sale of approximately 23.45 grams of heroin hydrochloride, a narcotic drug, after it had been imported and brought into the United States, knowing the same to have been imported and brought into the

United States contrary to law.

(Title 21, United States Code, Section 173, Section 174; Title 18, United States Code, Section 2.)

#### COUNT THREE

On or about the 9th day of April 1971, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant ROBERT RAY DANIELS, a/k/a "Dutch Schultz" and the defendant RICHARD THRASHER did receive, conceal, sell and facilitate the transportation, concealment and sale of approximately 150.4 grams of heroin hydrochloride, a narcotic drug, after it had been imported and brought into the United States, knowing the same to have been imported and brought into the United States contrary to law.

(Title 21, United States Code, Section 173 and Section 174; Title 18, United States Code, Section 2.)

#### COUNT FOUR

From on or about the 1st day of May, 1971 up to and including the 10th day of October, 1972, within the Eastern District of New York, and elsewhere, the defendant ROBERT RAY DANIELS, a/k/a "Dutch Schultz", did knowingly and intentionally engage in a continuing criminal enterprise as defined in Title 21, United States Code, Section 848(b), in that the defendant ROBERT RAY DANIELS, a/k/a "Dutch Schultz", did knowingly and intentionally commit violations of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1) and Section 846 as alleged in part in Count One of this Indictment, which violations were part of a continuing series of violations of said statutes undertaken in concert with at least five other persons with respect to whom the defendant ROBERT RAY DANIELS, a/k/a "Dutch Schultz", occupied the position of organizer and other positions of a supervisory and managerial nature and from which continuing criminal enterprise the defendant ROBERT RAY DANIELS, a/k/a "Dutch Schultz", obtained substantial income and resources.

In addition to the penalties provided for by Title 21, United States Code, Section 848(a)(1), the defendant ROBERT RAY DANIELS, a/k/a "Dutch Schultz", shall, upon conviction in this

seemed her him

in such enterprise together with his interest in, claims against, and property and contractual rights of any kind affording a source of influence over such enterprise.

(Title 21, United States Code, Section 848.)

A TRUE BILL.

Lillian Cale FOREMAN.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY



Ball. 8.  RAYMOND J. DEARIE  RASSISTANT U. S. Attorney	T. 21, U.S.C. §173 T. 21, U.S.C. §174 T. 21, U.S.C. §846 T. 21, U.S.C. §848 T. 18, U.S.C. §848 T. 18, U.S.C. §2	THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  BILLY AUSTIN, ET AL.,  Defendants.	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  Eastern District of New York  Criminal Division	Жо
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### 73 CR 600 :- 43.7 MISTRAVIA, 7.

D. C. Form No. 100

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JOHN F		GERALD	NIMS (	'non'')	834-1144		
	COOPER	WILLIA	M MOORE	("B.I.")	for deft.3 Jeffrey 11 NYC. 1001	Iman, 01	3dw
ROBERT	RAY DANIELS ("E	NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE OWNER, WHEN PERSON NAMED IN					
	ET EVALS ("Harris		, LAI	RRY STEWART	For Defendant:		
	I FERNANDEZ ("Sli		RICHA		Richard Rose	enkranz-bu	20.0
	R GILLORE V		/ CLIN	TON WHITE	Street- Bro	oklyn, N.	11.
GATTI	S HINTON	*			875-9440 for deft. h	IMS:Bruce	St
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DATE				PROCEEDINGS		1 1	
	Supersed	Ing I -/Indic	tment f	iled.		1/-	
6/19/73	Notice of Readi	page for	Trial f	iled. (W. G	ILMORE, J.FE	RI'ANDEZ,	J.DI
6/22/73	A. COOPER, H. EVA	NS, R. DAN	IELS)				
6/22/73	- Comme Ad Prosentendum filed (H. E		EV				
0/22/13	I FERNANDEZ)						
6/22/73	By TRAVIA, J Writs issued, ret. 7/9/73 . ( H. EVAIS & J. FERLAND						
6/22/73	COLA / CUED CUED CUED CONTACT POLICE		<u>:00R</u>				
	MC CALLUM MIMS	MATTHEW	5)				
7/2/73	Notices of App	earances	filed.	(for defts	MOORE, DANIE	, Dicta	,
		or rich and	THRASE	ER)			
7/2/73	D. TRAVITA I	- Order a	poointi	ng counse!	filed. (LANG.	AND MOUT	En
7/2/73	By TRAVIA, J Order appointing counsel filed. (LARRY STEVART)  Before TRAVIA, J Case called - Defts DANIELS, ERWART, AND MOORE  counsel present-Defts waive reading of the indiciment and each ca						
	counsel present	-Derts W	anve rea	ading of the			

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
1	pleas of not guil'y-Bail cont'd to DRYANT & MOORE-Deft DAMIELS, bail oct
	at \$10,000 Surety Zond-Defts COOPER & POLITE present Without County
	Court enters a plea of not guilty-Court assigns P. Passalacque as cour &
i	San dost Dail set at 10,000.00 Surety Bond for CODPER-Bail contid as To
	Polite -Deft THRASHER, MIN'S & MC COLLUM and counsel present-Dett arrang
	without counerl-Court enters a plea of not guilty-Court assigns G. All of on counsel for deft -Lail set at \$10,000.00 surety bond-30 days for more
	is granted to all defts-Defts AUSTIM, GILL DORE, MINTON, MATTHEMS and
	ANTE not present.
/5/73	Petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus AdProsequendum filed (W. GILMORE)
/5/73	By TRAVIA, J Writ issued, ret. 7/1/73.
7/6/73	By TPAVIA I - Order appointing counsel filed. (COOPER) & (POLITE)
7/9/73	Before TRAVIA, J Case called - Deft GILMORE and counsel present -Deft Walk
	reading of indictment and enters a plea of not guilty-10 days for motions-
	present-Deft value regading of the indictment and each enters a plea of he
	guilty-Bail set at \$10,000.00 for deft EVANS_N -Bail cont'd as to deft FLE
	30 days for motions
6/9/73	Notice of Appearance filed. (EVANS)
7/9/73	Writ retd and filed. Executed. (W. GELMORE and EVANS)
7/3/73	Before TRAVIA, J C se called - On motion of AU'SA Dearie for Bench Warrant issued (MATTHEWS)
	filed for Rill of Particulars, Discovery (7-26-73)
7-23-73	Notice of Motion filed for Bill of Particulars, Discovery (deft COOPER)
7-23-73	ret. July 26, 1973.
7-26-7	3 Before TRAVIA J - Case called - motion for Bill of Particulars & Inspec
	which warked Off Calendar. (defts COOPER & POLITE)
0 /20 /72	9/21/73 c Lill of portioulars etc
8/28/73	(RICHARD THRASHER)
-21-73	Before Travia J - Case called - Motion for Bill of Particulars marked off
,- <u>21-</u> /3	(Richard Thrasher)
	Writ retd and filed- Executed (FERNANDEZ)
10/2/73 0-4-73	Refore Travia J - Case called - deft Clinton White & counsel E. Kelly
	of Legal Aid present - deft arraigned on this case & relating case
	73 CR 101 and enters a plea of not guilty on both cases - order appptg.
-	counsel signed.
10-4-73	By Travia J - Order filed apptgcounsel lfor deft WHITE
B-100-100-100-100-100-100-100-100-100-10	

DATE ·	PROCEEDINGS
	net Austin knought into court on
12-28-7	3 Defore TRAVIA, J Case called - Deft Austin brought into court on a bench warrant - Deft present without counsel - Court appoints John
	C. Corbett as counsel- Deft waives reading of the indictment and th
	court enters a plea of not guilty- Bail fixed at \$100,000 Surety Do
	in a control August Millinger and into this
12-23-73	- sparse onder appointing counsel filed (AUSTIN) (Taled in thi
12-13-73	22 107/ filed received ITOM Chambers IIom
1-24-74	page (re hail of deft Wm. Moore)
1-24-74	- Order filed that the Govt Will prepare the
	By WEINSTEIN J - Order Tried that the Clerk after obtaining the necessary Order as requested by the Clerk after obtaining the
	consent of the deft. / 136 100 1305 1011
1/05/7/	TRAVIA I - Case called-/Deft not present- (de.c 3. 100112)
1/25/74	P. St. in suctody but his atty present-Hearing held-Add to 2/1//4
2-1-74	The control of the co
	hail (JOSEPH POLITE) - Bail conditions amended to \$100,000.00
	personal recognizance bond to be signed by Mr. & Mrs. John
	Polite and Mr. Joseph Polite plus deed to the house at 21 Eldert
	Street, Brooklyn, N.Y.
2-8-74	By WEINSTEIN, J Order filed that the order of Judge Rosling dated
2-0-1	na 72 meleasing hail in the amount of 57,500 to John C. Mooney
	to 680R310 and 680R351 is hereby vacated- and the Clerk shall cames
	check in the amount of \$7,500 and shall credit \$7,500 to John C. M.
	and retain custody of this amount as partial security for the \$250
	bond previously executed by the deft William Moore and consent of
	U.S. Attorney is to be affixed before this order becomes effective
	(Order filed in 73 CR 101) (consented to by A.U.S.A. Dearie on 3
3-12-	74 Notice of Motion filed & Memorandum of Law in support of
· 16 .	motion for Discovery as to deft Billy Austin (ret. March 15,1974)
3/15/7	discovery andinspection, etcMotion consent
3-28-	74 Magistrate's file 74 M 435 inserted into CR file.
4-3-74	1 2 29-7/ received from chambers of Judge Havia
	filed as a motion for reduction of ball. (Billy Master)
4-3-7	as a motion for reduction of ball. (Billy Added)
4-3-74	- 1 2 7/ From Atty John C. Corbett received from Cham
	of Judge Iravia and IIIed
D. C.	

D. C. 109

5-17-74	Before TRAVIA, J Case called- Deft BILLY AUSTON and counsel present-Deft
	motion to reduce bail to \$25,000 Surety Bond granted-Deft to report every
	Friday Morning at 11:00 A.M. to U.S. Attorney- Deft CLIMTON WHITE and cou
1	present-Deft's motion to reduce bail to \$2,500 Surety Bond-Case adid to
	6-7-74 for status report .
5/7/74	Before TRAVIA, J Case called - Case held in abeyance - Subject to a
	telephone call
8-1-74	Notice of Motion filed compelling defts DANIELS, EVANS, COOPER & BRYANT
	to furnish handwriting exemplars, etc ( returnable 8-9-74)
8-7-74	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum filed (Evans)
8-7-74	By NEAHER, J - Writ Issued, ret. 8-16-74 (Evans)
8-9-74	Before NEAHER, J - case called - adjd to 8-16-74(Austin-for compelling
	defts to furnish handwriting exemplars, etc.)
8-16-74	Before Neaher, J- case called - motion argued and motion granted -
	Order to be submitted by the atty for the Govt.
8-16-74	
No.	by the Govt (see Judges notation on reverse of motion papers)
8-20-74	Petition for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum filed (COOPER)
8-20-74	By NEAHER, J Writ issued, Ret. 8-26-74 (COOPER) *
8-21-74	Writ retd and filed - Executed (Evans)
-6-74	Writ retd and filed- executed(COOPER)
9-11-74	By NEAHER, J - Order filed that the defts Daniels, Harriet Evans,
	Cooper & John Bryant furnish handwriting exemplars in the above case,
	etc. (see Order for details) Order dated Aug. 19, 1974 but received and filed in Clerks Office on 9-11-74.
9/18/74	Notice of Motion, ret. Sept. 27, 1974 re: to dismiss the indictment
	as to deft Austin filed.
9/18/74	Memorandum on behalf of deft Billy Austin in Support of Motion to dismiss
	the indictment filed.
9-27-74	Before TRAVIA J - case called - motion to dismiss is withdrawn(Austin)
•	defts motion for reduction of bail granted - cash bail of \$2500.00
	to be posted.
9-30-74	Notice of motion to dismiss filed- and Memorandum of Law filed(CLINTON W)
10-4-74	Before Travia J - case called - motion to dismiss withdrawn (White)
10-21-	74 By Schiffman, Magistrate - Order for acceptance of cash bail filed
	(BILLY AUSTIN)
/30/74	Writ retd and filed- executed (ALVIN COOPER)
1-14-74	Magistrate's file 74 M 1518 inserted into CR file.

at.

-	
DATE	PROCEEDINGS
2/14/75	Writ retd and filed- executed (STEWART)
	Writ retd and filed - executed (COOPER)
2/28/75	Defore MISMLER, CH. J Case called - Motion to modify bail argued - Motion gra
	Bail modified to the release of the homes of J. Dunkin and P. Mims as
	to the deft J. Nims
2/28/75	Notice of Notion, YMX for lack of a fast and speedy trial filed. (no ret.
	date).
3/4/75	By MISHLER, CH.J Order filed that the deed to property owned by Mr. and
/	Mrs. Dunham be released and exonerated as collateral to secure bail, etc.
	(MIMS) (order entered in 73CR101)
3/6/75	Notice of motion to dismiss filed ret. 3/14/75 (ALVIN COOPER)
3/7/75	Petition of Mabeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum filed (A. COOPER)
3/7/75	By PLATT, J Writ issued, ret. 3/14/75
3/10/75	Notice of motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial filed(EVANS)
3/14/75	Before MISHLER, CH.J Case called- Pre-trial conference held- All counse
	present except Nancy Rosner and John C. Corbett- All defts present excep
	deft Austin, Evans, Fernandez, Mathews, Polite, Stewart and Thrasher-
	deft Bryant, Mims and Moore agree to have their counsel represent them
	and are aware of a possible conflict of interest-Motion by deft McCollum
	to release her bail money is denied-Govt will relate to defts pretrial
<u> </u>	discovery and inspection- Hearing on motion to suppress set down for
	3/20/75 at 9:30 A.M All motions returnable by 4/4/75 at 2:00 P.M.
	Trial scheduled for 4/14/75- Pro-se speedy trial motion by deft Fernandez
-	adubmitted- decision reserved- The Govt to comply with the deft COOPER'S
	request as to discovery and inspection
3/14/75	K. 1 5:1-1/GTTVODEN
3/14/75 3-20	
_ <del> </del>	to 4-4-75 at 2:00 PM.
4-2-75	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum filed (EVANS,
4 - 73	STEWART & FERNANDEZ)
4-2-75	
	5 Notice of Motion filed (Clinton White) for dismissal of the Indictment
	(ret. 4-18-75)
4-4-7	5 Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - hearing on motion to suppress
	held - the following attys were present at the hearing; John Corbett for deft Austin; Alan Scriber for deft Bryant; Treavor Headley for deft
	Cooper; deft Albert Kreigher for deft Daniels; Gilbert Epstein for deft

Co

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
	Refore MISHLER, CH J - Case called - April 14, 1975 for trial;
	Mar.14, 1975 for Pre Trial.  Petitions for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum filed(STEWARY
11/19/74	Petitions for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum filed (STEWART By MISHLER, CH.J writs issued, ret. 11/29/74 (STEWART and COOP)
11/19/74	By MISHLER, CH.J Order appointing counsel filed (COOPER)
11/29/74	DATE OF THE COLUMN CONTROL OF THE COURSE THE
11/29/74	ByMISHLER, CH.J.4 Order appointing counsel filed (Larry Steward)
12-29-74	Before Mishle Ch J - case called - adjd to 12-6-74 (for appt
* ONE HOUSE	of counsel.
12/6/74	Before MISHLER, CH.J Case called- Defts Gilmore & Stowart pres Deft MCallum not present-Adjd to 12/20/74 as to deft Gilmore for
	assignment of counsel-Bench Warrant ordered for deft McCallum
12/6/74	Bunch warrant issued (McCALLUM)
12-12-74	Magistrate's file 74 M 1429 inserted into CR file.
12/20/74	Refore MISHLER, CH.J Case called- Deft GILMORE andxenumsexxx :
	an attorney- Court advised counsel of the pre-trial date and tr
12/20/74	Notice of appearance filed (GILMORE
1-3-75	Notice of Motion filed as to deft JOSEPH FERNANDEZ for dismissa.
	(forwarded to Judge Mishler)
1/3/75	Refore MISHLER, CH.J Case called- Deft BRYANT not preset - sen
	and execution stayed until 1/10//5 by 9:30 Art.
1/3/75	Letter to chambers from Albert Krieger, esq. filed
1/3/75	Notice of motion to dismiss indictment filed (Joseph Fernandez)
:	ret. 3/14/75
1/10/75	Before MISHLER, CH.J Case called- Deft BRYANT and counsel pre
	Bryant retained Alan Scribner in place of Ivan Fisher
	Notice of appearance filed (ERYANT)
1-17-75	
	setting case for Pre Trial on Friday, March 14,1975 and to proceed to trial on April 14, 1975. (Retd to Chambers as direct
	11 D filed/Coope
1-22-7	
1-22-75 2-5-75	1 (000,000)
-	- 5 WESTER ON I Compalled Motion withdrawn by deft Nim
2/7/75	the Surety Bond- Deft HAMPTON and counsel present- Bench warren
	as to deft Hampton- Mr. Winograd relieved as counsel for dert H
	Court appointed Richard Rosenkranz
× 2/7/7	By MISHLER, CH, J Order appointing = counsel filed (HAMPTON) a/k
D. C. 10	09

CR-600 CRIMINAL DOCKET

DATE	PROCEEDINGS '
	Evans; Robert Schmukler for deft Gilmore; Richard Rosenkranz for
	deft McCallum; Peter Passalacqua for deft Polite; Stephen
	Flambaft for deft Stewart; Joanna Seybert Of Legal Aid for deft
	White; Deft WHITE present in court - Hearing concluded - all
	briefs on suppression hearing by 4-8-75.
-7-75	Notice of Motion filed for suppressing evidence(recvd from
	Chambers) Evans & Daniels.
-8-75	By MISHLER, CH J - Notice of Appearance and substitution
	of counsel filed (deft John Bryant)Jeffrey Ullman in place of
	Alan Scribner. (signed by Judge Mishler on 4-3- but received
	and filed in Clerks Office on 4-8-75)
-8-75	By MISHLER, CH J - Order to Show Cause filed as to why all
	sealed tape recorded conversations made should not be delivered
	forthwith for use in forthcoming trial (REXTREEXXXXXXX 4-10-75)
	and Affidavit of THOMAS ARMET filed; together with Govts Memo-
	randum of Law in support of wiretap etc. filed; with proof/service.
4-8-75	Defendant Bryant's Memorandum of Law filed in support of motion
	to suppress filed.
4-10-75	
	the question of whether the testimony of Donald James is
	suppressible, etc. filed.
/11/75	Govt's memorandums in opposition of motions to dismiss filed (4)
. ==1,15	(WHITE) (AUSTIN) (FERNANDEZ) (DANIELS, EVANS)
4-1/-7	Govts Memorandum of Law filed in opposition to motion to
4-14-1	suppress evidence obtained under search warrant.
/14/75	Voucher for compensation of counsel filed (COOPER)
-14-75	By MISHLER, CH J - Memorandum of Decision and Order filed
	denying defts motion to suppress evidence (EVANS, DANIELS &
	JOHN BRYANT)
4-14-75	
	counsels except for defts GATTIS HINTON & FRANK MATTHEWS-trial
	ordered and BEGUN - Jurors selected and sworn - Trial contd to
	4-15-75.
4-14-7	
4/15/7	
-12511	defts HINTON and MATTHEWS- Trial resumed-Trial contd to 4/16/75 at 10:
-	A.M.
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6-75	Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - all defts present with counsel,
	except defts Hinton & Matthews -Trial resumed - Juror #6 excused by the
	court with the consent of the defts - motion argued by defts Bryant,
	Mims, Moore, Polite & White for a mistrial is denied - trial contd to
	4-17-75.
-75	Before MISHLER, CH J - case called motion to dismiss argued - also
	pro se motions by defts DANIELS & EVANS to dismiss - Motions argued and
	decision reserved.
775	Before MISHLER, CH.J Case called- A'll defts present with commsel except
	defts Hinton and Matthews-Trial resumed-Motion by defts Cooper, McCollum,
	Mims and Moore for severance denied-Motion argued by deft Thrasher for severance
	ance denied-Trial contd to 4/21/75 at 10:00 A.M.
21-75	Letter filed dated 2-18-75 re deft John Bryant from Jeffrey llmann, Esq.
-	counsel for deft (received from Chambers and retd as requested)
21-7	Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - all defts present with counsels
	except defts HINTON & MATTHEWS - trial resumed - Trialcontd to 4-22-75.
2-75	Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - all defts present with counsels - except defts HINTON & MATTHEWS - trial resumed and contd until 1:00 P.M.
• •	
	because of the illness of deft AUSTIN - at 1:10 PM the case was adjd to
-	4-23-75 at 10:00 AM because deft AUSTIN was in the hospital.
3/75	Before MISHLER, CH.J Case called- Defts present with counsel except for
	Hinton and Mathews-On motion of govt defts Cooper and Polite are severed for
-	trial-Trial resuemd at 2:20 P.MTrial contd to 4/24/75 at 10:00 A.M.  Before MISHLER, CH.J Case called- Defts and counsel present except deft
4/75	Hinton, Matthews, Cooper and Polite - Trial resumed- Motion by deft Daniel
	for severance and mistrial denied- Trial contd to 4/25/75 at 10:00 A.M.
25/7	
23/1	defts Hinton, Matthews, Cooper and Polite- Trial resumed- Trial contd to
	4/28/75 at 10:00 A.M.
28/7	
20/1 8/75	Before MISHLER, CH.JCase called- Defts present with counsel except defts
8//5	Hinton, Matthews, Cooper and Polite-Juror #1 reported ill- trial to be conte
	on 4/29/75 at 10:00 A.M.
9775	Before MISHLER, CH.J Case called- Defts present with counsel except deft
	Rinton, Matthews, Cooper and Polite-On motion of defts Bryant, Daniels, Evan
	Fernandez, Gilmore, McCollum, Mims, Stewart, and White for a mistrial is gran
	defts severed from trial- On consent of defts Moore and Thrasher and govt
	trial will continue on with 11 jurors-stipulation signed-trial resumed

73 CR 600 CRIMINAL DOCKET

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
	Trial as to other defts will begin on 5/5/75 at 10:00 A.MGovt
	Motion by defts Austin, Moore and Thrasher for judgment of acqu
	denied-Defts Austin and Thrasher rests-Deft Moore rests-Trial co
	4/30/75 at 10:00 A.M.
4-30-75	Pursuant to Federal Rule Criminal (23(b) consent to continue th
	trial in this case to verdict with 11 jurors and accept the
	unanimous verdict of eleven jurors as the verdict filed. Approved
<i>y</i>	by Chief Judge Mishler. (received from Chambrs and retd as reques
/30/75	Before MISHLER, CH.J Case called- Defts AUSTIN, MOORE and THR present with counsel-Trial resumed- Govt and deft rests-Motion
	for judgment of acquittal denied-Application by deft Austin for bail exonerated and to be remanded-motion grated-trial contd to
50000	10:00 A.M.
5-1-75	
	THRASHER present with counsels - trial resumed - at 11:35 AM
	the Jury retired for deliberations - at 6:47 PM the jury retd and asked to suspend for the day and to return for further
	deliberations on 5-2-75 at 9:30 am - bail reinstated as to defi
	AUSTIN and he may be released.
- 1 75	By MISHLER, CH J - Order of sustenance filed.
5-1-75	Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - defts MUSTIN, MOORE & THRAS
5-2-75	present with attys - trial resumed - at 9:30 At jury continues
	deliberations - at 3:50 PM jury returned and rendered a verdict
	guilty on countsland 3 as to deft THRASHER & guilty on count 1
	as to deft MOORE. Jury could not reach a verdict as to deft AUS
	and the court declared a mistrial as to deft AUSTIN - Pre Tria
	as to deft AUSTI. set down for May 5, 1975 at 10:00 am - Jury
	polled - jury discharged - trial concluded - sentences adjd
	without date as to defts THRASHER & MOORE- all motions reserve
	until time of sentences. Decision reserved as to Govts applica-
-	tion to increase bail as to defts MOORE & THRASHER - counsel f
	defts MOORE & THRASHER to appear in court with the defts on
	May 5, 1975 by 4:00 P,M.
5-2-75	
5-5-75	Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - defts AUSTIN, BRYANT, DAN
	EVANS, FERNANDEZ, GILMORE, McCALLUM, MIMS, STEWART & WHITE pres
	with attys - deft DANIELS withdraws plea of not guilty and afte
	being advised of his rights by the court and on his own behalf
D. C. 101	

DATE	PROCEEDINGS /6 5
	Trial as to other defts will begin on 5/5/75 at 10:00 A.MGovt rests—Motion by defts Austin, Moore and Thrasher for judgment of acquittal denied-Defts Austin and Thrasher rests-Deft Moore rests-Trial contd to
	4/30/75 at 10:00 A.M.
4-30-75	Pursuant to Federal Rule Criminal (23(b) consent to continue the trial in this case to verdict with 11 jurors and accept the unanimous verdict of eleven jurors as the verdict filed.Approved
	by Chief Judge Mishler. (received from Chambrs and retd as requested)
/30/75	Before MISHLER, CH.J Case called- Defts AUSTIN, MOORE and THRASHER present with counsel-Trial resumed- Govt and deft rests-Motion by defts
	for judgment of acquittal denied-Application by deft Austin to have his bail exonerated and to be remanded-motion grated-trial contd to 5/1/75 a
	10:00 A.M.
	Before MICHLER, CH J - case called - defts AUSTIN, MOORE &
	THRASHER present with counsels - trial resumed - at 11:35 AM
	the Jury retired for deliberations - at 6:47 PM the jury retd
	and asked to suspend for the day and to return for further
	deliberations on 5-2-75 at 9:30 am - bail reinstated as to deft
	AUSTIN and he may be released.
5-1-75	By MISHLER, CH J - Order of sustenance filed.
5-2-75	Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - defts MUSTIN, MCORE & THRASHER present with attys - trial resumed - at 9:30 At jury continues
	deliberations - at 3:50 PM jury returned and rendered a verdict of
	guilty on countsland 3 as to deft THRASHER & guilty on count 1
	as to deft MOORE. Jury could not reach a verdict as to deft AUSTIN
	and the court declared a mistrial as to deft AUSTIN - Pre Trial
	as to deft AUSTIN set down for May 5, 1975 at 10:00 am - Jury
	polled - jury discharged - trial concluded - sentences adjd
	without date as to defts THRASHER & MOORE- all motions reserved
	until time of sentences.Decision reserved as to Govts applica-
	tion to increase bail as to defts MOORE & THRASHER - counsel for
	defts MOORE & THRASHER to appear in court with the defts on
	May 5, 1975 by 4:00 P,M.
	Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - defts AUSTIN, BRYANT, DANIELS,
	EVANS, FERNANDEZ, GILMORE, McCALLUM, MIMS STEWART & WHITE present
	with attys - deft DANIELS withdraws plea of not guilty and after
D C 100	being advised of his rights by the court and on his own behalf
D. C. 109	

DATE	// K PROCEEDINGS
	served by the deft- On motion of A.U.S.A. Brewster the remaining
	are dismissed- Deft WILLIAM MOORE sentenced to imprisonment for
	period of 10 years- court advised deft of his right to appeal- C
	motion of A.US.A. Brewster the indictment is dismissed as to de
	COOPER, FERNANDEZ, NIMS, BRYANT, AUSTIN, POLITE, STEWART, MCCALLUM
	EVANS
6/20/75	Judgment and Commitment filed - certified copies to Marshal (DANI
6/20/75	Judgment and Commitment filed - certified copies to Marshal (MOOR
6/20/75	By MISHLER, CH.J Orders of dismissal filed (COOPER, FERNANDEZ,
	BRYANT, AUSTIN, POLITE, STIWART, MCCALLUM and EVANS)
6-20-7	5 Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - sentence adjd to June 27.6
	1975 as to deft RICHARD THRASHER
6/23/75	
6/27/75	The same of the sa
	THRASHER sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 10 years and
	\$10,000.00 on count 1 and a term of imprisonment of 10 years on
	3- said sentences to run concurrently- Court advised deft of hi
	to appeal- Clerk to filed notice of appeal without fee- bail co
6/27/75	
6/27/75	
6/27/75	Docket entries and duplicate of notice of appeal mailed to court
7,-1,10	appeals
6/27/75	Notice of appeal filed (WILLIAM MOORE)
6/27/75	Docket entries and uplicate of notice of notice of appeal mail
0/2///3	
6-30-7	5 Voucher for compensation of counsel filed (POLITE)
7/7/75	Vouchers for compensation of counsel filed (McCOLLOM and FERNANDE)
7/7/7	
7/9/75	Order received from court of appeals and filed that record be doc
1/1/13	on or before 7/16/75 (MOORE and THRASHER)
7/22/75	
7/11/75	75 M 1082 is inserted in CR file.
	A TRUA COPY ATYZED
	LINIS-ONST-
	To Cartrelly
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Exhibit 3 for Identification.

(So marked.)

THE COURT: All right, seat the Jury.

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen

We have reached that point in the trial where it becomes my duty to instruct you on the applicable law.

Placed on each chair this morning was a document described Memorandum of Verdict, because I don't know any other way of describing it. It has no place of official procedure in the Court.

I have Count One and Count Three on this sheet and it is in no way intended to fully describe the charge or the elements necessary.

You will see that I have a date January 17, 1973, and in parenthesis I have May 1, 1971, and I will explain the reason for that later.

We had a change in the law that I will more fully describe when the law under which these defendants are charged expired as of April 30th and a new law went into effect.

The Government must prove that all the elements of the crime charged or committed were performed before May 1, 1971, even though the conspiracy charged

Charge of the Court

goes to January 17, 1973.

So I say this is just a brief description of the charge, the nub of it. It is intended to emphasize to you that each defendant is being tried separately.

You must measure the evidence against each defendant separately. I think that it is important that we all understand what everyone who is involved in a criminal trial does or is expected to do or is obligated to do.

We understand that litigants, the litigants
are the Government of the United States, the defendants
Billy Austin, William Moore and Richard Thrasher,
they all are on the same footing in this Court. No
one stands taller than anyone else in this Courtroom.

The mere fact that the United States of America is a party should mean to you only that the United States of America has certain obligations in a criminal trial and the defendants have certain rights.

You must understand what the obligations are and you must understand what the defendants' rights are.

One of the lawyers in summation said they all stand on the same footing, the same level, the flat,

he called it, and I do not care which way you think of it, I just think that they are all of the same size figuratively in this Court. We have no favorites.

Then there are the lawyers, they represent
their clients' interest, and it is good that in that
representation, they represent their clients' interest
zealously and vigorously.

Mr. Fisher saw fit to apologize at one point in his summation for his loud voice. He even apologized for his size, but that is just his manner of representing a client.

I think all the lawyers in this case behaved admirably, in the finest tradition of the Bar. I think they did a fine job for their clients. That is the way it should be.

This is an adversary proceeding. It is not always that all the defendants agreed with each other, though I recognize or remember no conflict among them, but there certainly is a difference of opinion between the Government and the defendants. Each one takes a side of an important issue in this case.

The important issue, as you will later learn, and I will more fully explain, is that these defendants, Billy Austin, William Moore and Richard Thrasher,

the Government claims supplied narcotics to James and Daniels and in effect, the Government says We proved that by proof beyond a reasonable doubt," and on the other side, there is an attack on that position by the defendants, and they say "It has not been proved," and they are adversaries on that issue as well as others. But that is the crucial issue in the case.

This is called an adversary proceeding, so the lawyers are here to develop the evidence that is relevant or pertinent to the issue and they have done a fine job, as I have said.

The evidence is there and it is there developed for the Jury.

What is the Jury's function?

Well, the Jury, as the Court, is a judge.

The Jury is the judge of the facts. The Court, the judge of the law. The Court and Jury, as distinguished from the lawyers, are impartial, objective, dispassionate.

The lawyers, because of their relationship, couldn't be objective, try as they might. They represent a particular point of view.

The Court and Jury represents neither side,

Charge of the Court

neither point of view.

The Court and Jury represent neither side, neither point of view. The Jury is to deal with the evidence. The Court is to deal with the law.

A Jury trial works best, and by best, I mean fairness, when each participant in the trial understands and recognizes its own power and authority, its own obligations and also the obligations, the power and authority of all the other participants in the trial.

so, as between the Court and Jury, you must accept the law as the Court charges it. You may disagree with some of the principles of law. You may disagree with the statutory law as I read it. You may not like it. But it is not for you to like. I charge it, I hope and I believe, objectively without favor, because I believe it is the law and not because I like it or dislike it.

You must accept it in that spirit, judging the facts, which means in effect finding the facts, finding out what happened on the disputed issues in this case, applying the law as I charge it. You will then come to the ultimate decision in this case as to the guilt or innocence of each of the defendants

charged.

At the outset, I must comment on what one of the lawyers said in summation, and wide latitude is generally given to lawyers to comment on the evidence. But one lawyer said that Donald James and Nancy Marbury were on trial.

Well, if he meant in a sense that the Government's case rested on those witnesses, I would agree with him. But the statement standing alone is not accurate because the defendants on trial are the defendants I just named.

In every criminal case, an accused, a defendant, is presumed to be innocent.

In my charge, at times I will use "defendant" or "defendants," but even if I use the singular, I mean it as a group, collectively. I mean all three. It applies to all three defendants.

If I want to single out any particular defendant for a particular charge, then I will name the defendant.

So, when I say a defendant is presumed to be innocent, that means all three defendants are presumed to be innocent.

The presumption of innocence is a time-honored

#### Charge of the Court

presumption in Anglo-American law. It means that each defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charge in Count One and the defendant Thrasher is presumed to be innocent of the charge in Count Three.

It means that at the very outset of the trial,
you must conclude that the defendants are innocent
of the crimes charged. That presumption remains
throughout the trial and throughout your deliberations.
That presumption is enough to acquit a defendant.

You may find a defendant guilty of the crime charged only if the Government overcomes that presumption by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

what is a reasonable doubt?

A reasonable doubt is a doubt which a reasonable person would have after weighing all of the evidence. It is a doubt based on reason and common sense, a doubt based on your experience rather than a doubt based on speculation or emotion. It is not a vague or imaginary doubt.

A reasonable doubt is a kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in a matter of importance in his own life.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is therefore proof of such a convincing character that you will

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be willing to rely and act upon it unhesitatingly in the most important of your own affairs.

The Government's burden is not to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond all possible doubt.

There is a qualifying adjective. The Government's burden is to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government's burden is not to prove that every bit of evidence offered in the trial is true beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government's burden, heavy as it is, is to prove every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and later in the charge I will charge you on what the essential elements of the crime of conspiracy are, and the crime against the defendant Thrasher, in Count Three, on concealing, buying, receiving, selling and transporting heroin on April 9 1971.

Reasonable doubt may arise from the failure of the Government to produce evidence. The defendants do not have to prove their innocence. On the contrary, they are presumed to be innocent of the charges contained in the indictment and they may rely on the failure of the Government to prove their guilt.

The weight of the evidence is not necessarily

Charge of the Court

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determined by the number of witnesses testifying on either side. You should consider all of the facts and circumstances, and Judge it on the quality of the evidence offered.

Evidence is the method that the law uses to prove or disprove a disputed fact.

There are two general classifications of evidence, one is direct evidence and the other is circumstantial evidence.

(Continued on next page.)

THE COURT: (Cont'g.) Direct evidence is the testimony of witnesses as to what a witness saw or heard. Circumstantial evidence is a method of proving a disputed fact by drawing inferences based on good common sense and experience to arrive at the ultimate fact.

The example which I usually give, I thank, is more instructive than the abstract definition. If you were sitting here as a juror in a civil case and let us assume that the plaintiff A, sued the defendant, B, for personal injuries claiming that the defendant, B, passed a stop sign without stopping and then struck the plaintiff, A:

Let us assume that the circumstances were that
my courtroom deputy and myself were standing on the
on the street corner where the stop sign was erected.

If he were called to testify, let us assume that he
was facing the roadway and I, on the other hand, had
my back to the stop sign.

Now, the first step in the procedure is to identify the disputed issue. You must remember the plaintiff says the defendant driving his car drove past the stop sign without stopping.

The defendant, in effect, says "No, I stopped

at the stop sign and then proceeded." Well, as I say, if Mr. Adler were facing the stop sign, he might testify that the 1975 white Cadillac was driving down the roadway and he was talking with me and through or within the range of his peripheral vision, he noticed the white Cadillac driving at 65 miles an hour, saw it proceed to the stop sign and passed the stop sign and struck the plaintiff.

Now, that's direct testimony when the defendant passed the stop sign without stopping. If I
were called as a witness, I could testify as to the
circumstances, but I couldn't testify that the car
passed the stop sign without stopping.

I might say as I was speaking with Mr. Adler, my courtroom deputy, the '75 Cadillac caught my eye and I saw it coming down at 65 miles an hour, it passed behind me and about 75 or 100 feet later and about two or three seconds later, I saw it strike the plaintiff and cause the injuries.

Now, the circumstances based on my testimony alone would be that the motor vehicle traveling at about 65 miles an hour traversed 75 or 100 feet that I couldn't see and when I saw it again, two or three seconds had transpired and I think that based on those circumstances, your experi

circumstances, your experience and good common sense would tell you that that motor vehicle passed the stop sign without stopping.

It's obvious that had it stopped, it would have taken a few seconds to start up again and go, so through your mental processes you would arrive at that reasonable inference.

So, there the same disputed fact is proved by both the direct and the circumstantial evidence. The law doesn't hold that one type of evidence is of better quality than the other. In some cases, direct testimony is better. In some cases, circumstantial evidence is better.

The law requires that both on the direct evidence and the circumstantial evidence, the government prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

What is the evidence in this case? You must decide this case solely on the evidence that is adduced within the four walls of this courtroom, and the fair and reasonable inferences, based on your good common sense and experience to be drawn from the established facts.

First, there is the sworn testimony of the

witnesses, regardless of who may of called them. Then
it is the exhibits received in evidence and in this
case that includes the wiretapes. Then there are
facts which may have been admitted or stipulated to
between the parties. That is the evidence in the
case.

On that you you will make your determination in accordance with the law as I charge it. It might be helpful to point out matters that are not evidence in the case, not the testimony, not the basis for your decision.

We start with the opening statements and then the closing statements of counsel. In opening, they describe their positions and the purpose was to make it easier for the jury to follow the testimony.

In summations, they argued the testimony to you. That was for the purpose of focusing your attention on the evidence that they believed was important to the issues. The defendants argue theories of exculpability. In effect they said the government failed to prove the guilt of these defendants and you must acquit.

The government, on the other hand, argued theories of inculpability, of guilt. Mr. Caden argued

that the government proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The opening and summations were valuable tools to help you arrive at the truth, but they were not evidence. Any statement by the Court is not evidence. Any questions the Court put, you should not attach any special evidence to them.

If I happened to ask a question and I did it infrequently, it was only because at the moment I felt a little confused about some testimony and so I thought that if I was, it might be that you were too, and I had hoped that the questioning would clear it up and that was the only purpose.

At times, answers were stricken from the record.

As I directed the Reporter to strike it from his record, so I directed you to disregard it and figura ively striking it from your mind and your consideration.

At times, objection was sustained to questions asked by a lawyer. Now, you may not speculate on what the answers might have been had the witness be permitted to answer. On this same theory, the witness did not answer. The question standing alone is not testimony. It is not in the record, so you may not consider it.

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At times during the trial the lawyer incorporated a fact which had no basis in the record and the witness said, no, and rejected it. If the witness rejected it, you have no reason to believe that that fact is true and you may not consider it as part of the record.

You, the jurors are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses, which means the believability of their testimony and the weight their testimony deserves.

Scrutinize the testimony given and the circumstances under which each witness testified and in every manner of evidence which tends to show whether a witness is worthy of belief.

(Continued on next page.)

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Charge of the Court

witness' intelligence. Consider his motive, which means consider why he is testifying and consider his state of mind while on the witness chair before you. Consider his demeanor and manner while answering questions. In other words, did he give you the impression that he was fully truthful with you? Was he evasive? Consider the witness' own ability to observe the matters as to which he has testified, whether he shall have impressed you as having an accurate recollection of those matters.

You'll recall on cross-examination at times
the witness was directed to answer yes or no and I
told you the reason for it. The cross-examiner has
the right to control the cross-examination. At times
it is difficult in examining or thinking about a
question to answer yes or no. There is an inclination
to want to explain. Take that under consideration.
Take into consideration the relation that each
witness might bear to either side of the case, the
manner in which each witness might be affected by the
verdict, the extent to which at all the witness'
testimony is contradicted or corroborated by other
testimony or evidence in the case. If a witness is

shown to have knowingly testified falsely under oath concerning a material matter, you have the right to distrust all the testimony that that witness gave on the theory that the witness is unworthy of belief or, on the other hand, you may, after you reject the testimony you recognize as false, accept a portion or all the rest of the testimony that you feel is believable. That principle simply underscores the wide discretion the jury has in weighing the credibility, the believability of the testimony of witnesses who testify before you.

The law does not compel a defendant in a criminal case to take the witness stand and testify. No presumption of guilt may be raised and no unfavorable inference of any kind may be drawn in the failure of a defendant to testify. A defendant, as previously charged, may rely on the failure of the Government to prove its case. It would be improper for you to discuss the failure of a witness to testify at any time and during your deliberations.

In this case, Donald James and Nancy Marbury said that they participated in the conspiracy charged in the indictment and Donald James testified that he participated in the sale of the heroin on

#### Charge of the Court

April 9th, 1971. Where one participates in a crime charged, he becomes an accomplice. An alleged accomplice does not become incompetent to testify because of participation in the crime charged. On the contrary, the testimony of an alleged accomplice alone, if believed by the jury to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, may be of sufficient weight to sustain a verdict of guilty, even though not corroborated or supported by other evidence.

However, the jury should keep in mind that such testimony is also to be received with caution and weighed with great care. You should never convict a defendant upon the unsupported testimony of an alleged accomplice, unless you believe such testimony to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony of an informer who provides evidence against a defendant for pay or for immunity from punishment or personal advantage or vindication, must be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. The jury must determine whether the informant's testimony has been affected by interest or by prejudice against a defendant and the extent of such interest or prejudice. The testimony of a witness may be

# Charge of the Court

discredited or impeached by showing that the witness has been convicted of a felony -- that is, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of years. In this case, the witness Donald James was a convicted felon. A prior conviction does not render a witness incompetent to testify, but is merely a circumstance which you may consider in determining the cradibility of the witness. It is the province of the jury to determine the extent to which a felony conviction attacks the credibility of a witness.

examination consisted in part of confronting the
Government's witnesses with prior statements which
the defendants claim in their summation were
inconsistent with the testimony given before you.
At times defendants' counsel pointed to the failure
of the witness to give testimony prior to the time
he or she took the witness stand, when it was
reasonable to expect that he or she would do so. Now,
evidence that at some time prior to the time the
witness took the stand to testify that witness said
or did something which is inconsistent with the
witness' testimony during the trial may be considered
by the jury for the purpose of judging the credibility

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# Charge of the Court

of the witness, if adopted by the witness. That is, if the witness admitted before you that he made the prior statement that is inconsistent with his testimony or her testimony, it may also be used as affirmative evidence in the case.

Now, there are times that you recognize that telling a variation of an act or transaction a second time is different than the first time. There are times when you recognize that different people of integrity and truthfulness ing the same event might see it differently. Those are normal variations. I would think that if a witness repeated what was said before word for word, pause for pause, gesture for gesture, you'd suspect that testimony. You would feel that it was just a story that he or she was telling, that it was rehearsed. So in evaluating the prior statements and in making a determination as to how it affects a witness' testimony, you must first determine whether it is just a normal variation or whether it is an inconsistent statement. If you find it is an inconsistent statement, will determine whether it is inconsistent as to a material matter or as to a material issue -- whether it is material or

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immaterial -- and then you determine the effect
that the prior inconsistent statement should have on

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the credibility of the witness.

indictment. The Congress determines what is a crime.

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It is all based on statute. Congress passes a bill

We now come to the charge or charges in the

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and the President signs it. Most of the Federal law

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is codified. It is put into books under title for

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easy reference. The charge upon which this

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indictment is based or, rather, statute upon which

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this indictment is based is 21, United States

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Code Sections 173 and 174. Title 21 is just "Food

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and Drugs." This statute was in effect for many

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years and in 1970 the Congress passed a law known as

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the "Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970", which

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became effective May 1, 1971. The statute that I am

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about to read to you was the law until and including

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April 30th, 1971. The Congress in its wisdom saw

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fit to strictly control the importation, transporta-

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tion, sale, manufacture and distribution of narcotic

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drugs, so in Section 173 of Title 21, the Congress

in effect said:

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No opium or opium derivative, which includes

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heroin, may be imported into the United States except

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for very specific medicinal and experimental purposes, and it said it in this language:

I will just read the pertinent part:

"It is unlawful to import or bring any narcotic drug into the United States or any territory under its control, except such amounts of crude opium as the Commissioner of Narcotics finds to be necessary to provide for medical and legitimate uses", and so forth.

That effectively barred the importation of heroin, except for those very narrow purposes.

Section 174 made it a crime to import or otherwise deal in heroin. It said it in this language:

"Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any narcotic drug into the United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment or sale of any such narcotic drug, after being imported or brought in, knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to law ..."

I will hesitate because that is what we call

the substantive acts. The Congress said, "Don't import, don't receive, don't conceal, don't buy, don't sell", and if you do it is a crime.

Now the next phrase is the conspiracy portion of that statute. It is very brief, but that is the phrase upon which count one is based:

"... or conspires to commit any of such acts in violation of the laws of the United States, commits a crime."

(continued on next page)

Shapiro T2amR2. follows

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Charge of the Court

Now, there is one other paragraph that I will refer to later, but I will read now. I may read it a second time, but I do not want to forget it.

It says: "Whenever on trial for a violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have or to have had possession of a narcotics drug, such possession shall deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury."

Just keep that last paragraph in mind and I will refer to it later.

Now, I charge you that heroin hydrochloride is a narcotic drug.

both charges. Again I remind you that the indictment is not proof of the statements or allegations made in the counts of the indictments. It is just the manner in which the law brings a defendant into court to answer the charges, nothing more, and these defendants have said "Not guilty." The defendant Moore and the defendant Austin have said "Not guilty" to count 1 and the defendant Thrasher has said "Not guilty" to counts 1 and 3.

Now you recognize that others were charged in

the indictment and you saw that some was severed and you should not be concerned with any that were severed. Again I say your concern is the guilt or innocence of those before you, but I will read the entire indictment in its original form.

#### Count 1 charges:

From on or about the 1st day of June 1970 up to and including the 17th day of January 1973, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York, and elsewhere, the defendants Billy Austin, John Bryant, Alvin Cooper, Robert Ray Daniels, a/k/a "Dutch", Harriet Evans, a/k/a as "Harriet Clark", Joseph Fernandez, a/k/a as "Slim", Walter Gilmore, G/ttis Hinton, Frank Matthews, Bonnie McCallum, Gerald Mims, a/k/a "Pop", William Moore, a/k/a "B.I.", Joseph Polite, a/k/a "Junior", Larry Stewart, Richard Thrasher, Clinton White, a/k/a "Angel", together with Donald James, named herein as a co-conspirator but not as a co-defendant, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and agree together and with each other to violate prior to May 1, 1971, Sections 173 and 174 of Title 21, United States Code.

"(1) It was part of said conspiracy that prior

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to May 1, 1971 the defendants unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly would receive, conceal, buy, sell and facilitate the transportation, concealment and sale of large amounts of heroin, a narcotic drug, after such narcotic drug had been imported and brought into the United States, knowing the same to have been imported and brought into the United States contrary to law."

2 is irrelevant here.

"(3) It was further a part of said conspiracy
that the defendants would conceal the existence of
the conspiracy and would take steps designed to
prevent disclosure of their activities.

"In furtherance of the conspiracy and to
effect the objects, thereof, the following overt acts,
among others, were committed within the Eastern
District and elswhere:

- "(1) In or about December 1970, in the vicinity of Tapscott Street and Dumond Avenue,
  Brooklyn, New York, the defendant Frank Matthews met with the defendant Robert Ray Daniels, a/k/a "Dutch" and the defendant Hariett Evans, a/k/a "Hariet Clark".
- Bar on St. Marks Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, the defendant Richard Thrasher met with Donald James, named herin as a co-conspirator but not as a

defendant.

"(3) In or about October 1970, in the vicinity of Montgomery Street and Rogers Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, the defendant William Moore, a/k/a "B.I." met Donald James, named herein as a co-conspirator but not as a defendant."

Do any of the attorneys want me to read the other obert acts?

MR. FISHER: No, your Honor.

MR. CORBETT: No, sir.

MR. CADEN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

"Count 3 charges on or about the 9th day of
April 1971, within the Eastern District of New York,
the defendant Robert Ray Daniels, a/k/a as "Dutch",
and the defendant Richard Thrasher did receive,
conceal, sell and facilitate the transportation,
concealment and sale of approximately 150.04 grams
of heroin hydrochloride, a narcotic drugs, after it
had been imported and brought into the United States,
knowing the same to have been imported and brought
into the United States contrary to law."

Count 3 charges the defendant Thrasher with what we call the substantive crime, the actual act of receiving, concealing, selling and facilitating the

concealment and sale of the heroin.

Count 1 on the other hand charges the conspiracy to perform the various acts in violation of the Federal Drug laws.

In other words, count 1 is the conspiracy charge. The phrase in 174 which I read makes the conspiracy to perform these unlawful acts a separate crime. It is the agreement, the getting together, the joint venture, if you will, the partnership that the law condems.

what is a conspiracy? A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons organized to accomplish some unlawful purpose and in this case the unlawful purpose was to deal in heroin. A conspiracy has been described as a partnership in criminal purposes in which each member of the partnership becomes the agent of every other member of the partnership for matters dealing with partnership business.

Members of the conspiracy are called
"conspirators" or "co-conspirators." The mere
similarity in conduct of various persons and the fact
that they have been associated with each other and
may have assembled together and discussed common
names and interests does not necessarily establish
proof of the existence of the conspiracy. The mere

# Charge of the Court

association of an accused with someone that you find was a member of the conspiracy is not enough to bring an accused into the conspiracy. The mere presence of an accused at a time and place where the activities of the unlawful conspiracy are being conducted is not enough. The Covernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy. That means the Government must prove that the accused knew the business of the conspiracy and did something to participate in the conspiratorial business to promote its activities.

One may innocently participate in advance in the purposes of the conspiracy. If A were driving a car along the roadway and B hailed him and B had heroin in his pocket for delivery to a customer and A took B in his car and drove him along not knowing that he was advancing the purpose of the conspiracy, that would not make A a conspirator. It wasn't known. He wasn't aware that it was part of the business, so what he was doing — even though it advanced the business — didn't make him a knowing participant in the business.

However, the evidence in the case need not show that all the parties sat down and agreed to any

formal agreement. The agreement need not be expressed. In that respect it probably differs from a lawful partnership where usually, not always there either, but usually there are written agreements, written documents and it is more or less formal.

what the evidence in the case must show beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish that a conspiracy existed, is that the members in some way or some manner or through some contrivance positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish the comment and unlawful plan which again in this case was dealing in heroin. The proof need not show that all the means and all the methods set forth in the indictment were agreed upon or even that all the means were put into operation in order that all the persons that were charged were members of the conspiracy. What the evidence in the case must establish beyond a reasonable doubt is that the alleged conspiracy was knowingly formed.

In other words, those individuals who became members of the conspiracy knew and understood what it was organized for, the purpose of dealing in heroin, and that one or more of the means, or methods

## Charge of the Court

described in the indictment were agreed upon and used in an effort to accomplish the purpose of the conspiracy as charged in the indictment, and that two or more persons -- including one or more of the accused -- were knowing members of the conspiracy.

One may become a member of the conspiracy without knowing all the details and without knowing the structure of the conspiracy.

Again on the other hand, if someone just happens to further the purpose of the conspiracy without knowing that he is in fact furthering the business of the conspiracy, he does not become a member of that conspiracy. In order to bring an accused into the conspiracy — in other words, to find him to be a member of the conspiracy the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acted or participated knowingly and wilfully.

In other words, was aware of the business of the conspiracy, knew that it was to deal in heroin and entered the wilfully, which means voluntarily and intentionally, knowing that it was a violation of law to take part in any such venture.

(Cont'd on next page.)

THE COURT: (Cont'g.) We talk about the conspiracy as being like a partnership. You heard me say that during the trial. You may have some difficulty dealing with the concept if you think of it as being an equal partnership, where everone does the same kind of work and shares equally.

As a matter of fact, not all lawful partnerships are equal partnerships in which everyone performs
the same kind of work and shares equally in the profits. In this case, it is the theory of the government that the conspiracy was a chain conspiracy. That
means that various members of the conspiracy performed
different roles. They performed on different functional
levels.

As I understand it, the claim is that Frank
Matthews and the defendants Billy Austin, William Moore
and Richard Thrasher were suppliers to Donald James
and Robert Ray Daniels and that Robert Ray Daniels
and Donald James had various lieutenants.

As I recall it, Bryant, Cooper, Fernandez, Gilmore, Polite, Stewart and White. That there was an answering service or an order taker and that was Charlie Brown and Carol Brown, his wife; and that later Evans performed the services of a bookkeeper

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and that there were workers in the street that sold to users.

These workers at times or at a time numbered as many as 100 and among the workers were Bonnie McCallum and Gerald Mims.

Now, it is not necessary for the government to prove that these accused knew all the other workers or any of the workers. It is necessary for the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these defendants as suppliers were aware that the success of their portion of the conspiracy depended on the effort of others in the conspiracy, on the efforts of Donald James and Robert Ray Daniels, to dispose of the heroin that they supplied and in turn on the efforts of the workers to dispose of the heroin that they in turn received, to the users.

And that they were aware that there were others in various levels of performance and that success in the performance by the various people at various levels were necessary to the success of their own operation.

I charged you on an evidentiary matter and that was when you would treat statements made by the one conspirator outside the presence of the accused. I told you that under certain circumstances, you could

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treat those statements, even though not made by or in the presence of any accused, as evidence against an accused.

Whenever it appears beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case that a conspiracy existed and that an accused was one of the members, then the statements thereafter knowingly made and the acts thereafter knowingly done by any person likewise found. to be a member, may be considered by the jury as evidence in the case as to the accused, found to have been a member, even though the statements and acts may have occurred in the absence and without the knowledge of the defendant, provided such statements and acts were knowingly made and done during the term of the conspiracy and in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy.

Otherwise, any admission or incriminatory act made or act done outside of Court by one person may not be considered as evidence against any person who was not present and heard the statement made or saw the act done.

The government must prove the following three essential elements in order to establish the crime of conspiracy as charged in the indictment.

First, that the corapiracy described in the indictment was knowingly and wilfully and was existing at or about the time alleged for the purpose set forth, to wit, to deal in heroin.

of the conspiracy. That means the government must prove that the accused knew that the conspiracy was dealing in heroin and entered it voluntarily and intentionally, knowing that it was a violation of law. The government must also prove that the heroin was imported and that the accused knew that the heroin was imported and here in a few moments I will come back to that -- what I call the statutory inference, the paragraph I read under 174. There the government is aided by a statutory inference.

But in order for the government to prove that an accused knowingly and wilfully entered the conspiracy, it must be on the proof by testimony of a witness as to what that witness saw or heard the accused say or do.

The third essential element is that one of the conspirators thereafter knowingly committed an overt act in furtherance of the objects and purposes of the conspiracy.

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The government must prove all those essential elements by proof beyond a reasonable doubt before you may convict the accused. If the government has failed, then you must find the accused not guilty.

If the government has proved all those essential elements, beyond a reasonable doubt, then you have the obligation of finding the defendant guilty.

Count 3, again, charges only the defendant
Thrasher. The government must prove the following
essential elements of that crime charged. One, that
on or about April 9, 1971, the defendant Richard
Thrasher received, concealed, sold and facilitated
the transportation, concealment and sale of approximately 150.4 grams of heroin, as alleged, which heroin
will be imported or brought into the United States of
America contrary to law as charged.

Two, the acts were performed with the knowledge that heroin will be imported or brought into the United States contrary to law as charged.

Three, that Richard Thrasher performed the acts knowingly and unlawfully. In other words, that he knew that the package that the government alleges he delivered in the bathroom at Brownie's to James was heroin.

As I say, an act is done knowingly if done voluntarily and intentionally and not done because of mistake or accident. An act is done wilfully if done voluntarily and intentionally and with specific intent to violate the law.

Coming back to the statutory inference in 174, you understand the government must prove that the heroin was imported and that is really referring to Count 3. In Count 1, on the agreement the government must prove that the parties entered into the agreement intending to deal in heroin that was imported and that the government must prove in both counts that not only that it was imported but that the accused knew that it was imported.

First, Count 3: and knew that they had agreed to deal in imported heroin. Again, I will repeat this: Whenever on trial for violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize the conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.

If the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was in possession of heroin as

far as the Count 1 is concerned, it would be during
the term of the conspiracy or limited as it is by what
I told you, about the effectiveness of this statute at
anytime up to April 30, 1971 and that the defendant
knew that the substance that he or she possessed was
heroin, then the fact of knowing possession alone,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of knowing possession
on the part of any accused, unless explained to the
satisfaction of the jury by the evidence in the case,
permits the jury but does not require the jury, to
draw an inference and find that the heroin was imported
or brought into the United States contrary to law,
and two, that the accused knew that the heroin was
imported or brought into the United States contrary
to law.

(Continued on next page.)

between an inference and a conclusion which the jury may draw, based on experience and good common sense. The example of that, of course, is the method through which a disputed fact is proved through circumstantial evidence. A presumption, on the other hand, is a conclusion which the jury must accept and is over some only if proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the contrary is shown.

The example of that, of course, is the presumption of innocence. This permissible statutory inference, of course, is not binding upon you and yoummay refuse to draw that inference.

It is the government's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused against whom the inference may be drawn possessed the heroin. That defendant is under no burden to explain it. You may find the explanation in the record itself.

You are again reminded that the defendant has a constitutional right not to testify. The basis for the inference as it relates to heroin is supported by findings of various commissions on law enforcement.

One of them is the Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, in its 1967 report

and the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs Report of the 18th Section, in 1963, which found that all the heroin which reaches the American user is smuggled into the country from abroad.

Again, you may not draw any unfavorable inference because of the defendant's failure to testify. He has a constitutional right to do this and it would be improper for you to draw such an inference.

Specifically, on the subject matter that I am talking about on the knowing possession of heroin in the manner in which I have instructed you, the defendant's failure to testify concerning the circumstances should not be held against him.

You look through the record and see if there is an explanation there. We talked about possession and we talked about one conspirator being the agent for another conspirator who you find to be a member of the conspiracy. It doesn't apply to possession. Here because the knowing possession is so directly tied to guilt, that possession is personal.

In other words, the possession of heroin by

Donald James or by Nancy Marbury cann be attributed

to any of the accused for the purpose of drawing the

statutory inference. If you are to draw the inference,

it must be based on the finding that the accused himself had the heroin, possessed it, had it under his control.

I am about to excuse you from the courtroom but before I do, I want to again remind you that you have a duty to sift through the evidence. Based on the evidence, make your finding.

Having made a fact finding, in other words, found out, made a determination as to what happened, then apply the law as I have charged it. Each juror must decide for himself. In other words, this is in effect, eleven verdicts; when all eleven agree, it becomes the verdict of the case.

It would be improper for any juror to abandon that obligation, to say, in effect, "Well, I'll go along with whatever the rest of you say." That is wrong. It is equally wrong for any juror to take an intransigent and obdurate position and say, in effect, "I've made up my mind about this case and when the other ten come around to my way of thinking, then we'll have a verdict." That's wrong.

The entire process is a deliberative process.

It may be that during your deliberations you may arrive at a tentative verdict. And after discussing

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it with your fellow jurors, you may find that you may in good conscience and consistent with the evidence, give that verdict up and change it, take another position. Nothing wrong in that.

and exchange of views. In that exchange of views, there is nothing wrong in changing your derermination. But it must be based on a reason, found in the evidence. You do not have to justify what you are doing. Nobody is going to ask you, but, in other words, it must be based on reason and common sense and it must be based on the evidence in the case.

During your deliberations, you may have reason to communicate with the Court and if you do that, a note will be delivered by the Foreman to the Marshal assigned to the case and when I get it I will take it up with the lawyers.

If you ask for evidence, I shall try to find what you are looking for. I shall try to give you only what you ask for and no more. You may ask for the exhibits. I will not send any exhibits in. If you want all the exhibits, then all the exhibits will be sent in. If you want specific exhibits, we will give you those.

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When you shall have arrived at a verdict, then
I expect a note from the Foreman of the jury saying,
"We have arrived at a verdict." Do not tell me what
the verdict is. The verdict will be announced in
open court.

During your deliberations, do not tell me how you stand at any particular time, whether you are six to five, ten to one, eight to three. I am not interested. I am interested when you have arrived at a verdict and I know that means unanimous.

When you have arrived at a verdict, I will call you in. The Foreman will stand up and I will say substantially the following, "Mr. Foreman, in United States of America against Billy Austin, William Moore and Richard Thrasher, on Count 1, how do you find the defendant Billy austin," and you will announce, guilty or not guilty. "How do you find the defendant William Moore, guilty or not guilty." And you'll announce it. "How do you find the defendant Richard Thrasher, guilty or not guilty". And the Foreman will announce it.

When he has announced the verdict, then I will turn to Juror Number 2 and say, "You have heard the Foreman announce the verdict. Is that your verdict?"

And then Juror Number 3, 4, 5 and then to 11. Then
if all agree in open court, then it is the verdict of
the jury on Count 1 and then I will go to Count 3,
and say on Count 3, "How do you find the defendant
Richard Thrasher, guilty or not guilty?" And you will
announce the verdict.

At this moment I would ask you to leave the courtroom for just a few moments. Do not start your deliberations yet. I must have a talk with the lawyers first. The jury is excused.

(Continued on next page.)

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(The following occurred in the absence of the jury.)

THE COURT: Mr. Caden, any exceptions?

MR. CADEN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Corbett?

MR. CORBETT: No exceptions, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Schimmel?

MR. SCHIMMEL No exceptions, if your Honor please.

THE COURT: Mr. Fisher?

MR. FISHER: Your Honor, with regard to your charge about mere presence and knowledge, you indicated that mere presence isn't enough. Mere knowledge is not enough.

Most respectfully, your Honor, I think under United States against Terrell, the reversal as to McDonald in that case, the Second Circuit has indicated the defendant is entitled to that mere presence even coupled with knowledge is not enough.

That's all I'd ask for, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCHIMMEL: If your Honor pleases, I would have requested that you would add when you were talking about what is to be considered in reaching the verdict, you had mentioned sworn testimony, the

stipulations and the stipulated facts. I would request that you would add that part of that is to be considered as the defendant's plea of not guilty.

THE COURT: No, no.

Anything else?

MR. SCHIMMEL: No.

MR. CORBETT: I have a request on behalf of the defendant Austin.

During the course of the trail, certain evidence was admitted, certain testimony was admitted, testimony by Donald James, to the effect that the defendant Austin and he were engaged in a drug conspiracy in 1969, prior to the formation of this conspiracy.

In your Monor's charge you did not refer to the fact that was not part of the evidence in this case.

THE COURT: Certainly is. It is not part of the conspiracy but if it weren't part of the evidence, I wouldn't have admitted it.

MR. CORBETT: No. I should have said not part of the conspiracy. It's respectfully requested that the Court will remind the jury that any evidence of any transactions between Donald James and Billy Austin be not considered as part of the evidence of

the conspiracy.

THE COURT: May I have that?

(Record read.)

THE COURT: No. I will just say that it has a limited value and they only be used to determine whether the defendant Billy Austin entered the conspiracy. It has value. It has limited value.

It certainly may not be used as a -- I think

I charged that during the trial -- may not -- before
the conspiracy and certainly cannot be attributable
to anybody else.

MR. CORBETT: I will withdraw that request.

Judge.

THE COURT: Surely. Because I charged it before and it may just refresh their recollection.

MR. CORBETT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Bring them in.
(Jury present.)

THE COURT: In discussing what acts might conceivably bring an accused into the conspiracy, I said to you in effect, the mere fact that an accused happened to be present while conspiratorial activite were in progress or the mere fact that an accused knew what was going in and of itself was not enough to bring an accused into the con piracy.

I just want to make that in the conjunctive and say, even an accused was present and knew hat conspiratorial activites were in progress, it is not in and of itself enough to bring an accused into the conspiracy.

The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that that accused did something affirmatively, wilfully and knowingly, to further the business of the conspiracy before that accused may be found to be a member of the conspiracy.

Shall I excuse the jury for any further discussion on it, gentlemen?

MR. CORBETT: No sir.

MR. SCHIMMEL: No, if your Honor please.


MR. FISHER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Will the clerk swear in the marshals?

THE CLERK: Yes, your Honor.

(Two male marshals and one female marshal duly sworn by the clerk.)

just about 12:00. If I do not hear from by about a quarter of 12:00 or 10 of 12:00, I may very well release the lawyers and the litigants for their lunch.



Now, when they are out of the courtroom, I cannot make any decisions. I must consult with both sides. That is the way it is done.

So if you do not hear from me during that period, I want you to know it is not because I have forgotten you. It is only because I cannot do anything about it.

Do not hesitate to write any notes if you feel that you want the information transmitted to me; but if you do not get an answer, it has been explained to you at this point.

The jury is reminded that you took an oath when you were emparalled and that oat in effect said that you would render a true and just verdict and that means a verdict based on the evidence, in accordance with the law and free of all bias, prejudice or sympathy. I know that you will live up to your oath.

The jury is excused for deliberation on the matter before you.

(The jury started deliberations at 11:30 a.m. and the following occurred in their absence.)

MR. FISHER: The indictment isn't going in, is it, your Honor?



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